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INTRODUCTION.

Of all branches of the law there is probably not one
in which judicial legislation has been more vigorously indulged than in the construction and application of the statute
of frauds, which to the ordinary mind seems so plain as to
be incapable of misconstruction.

The amount of litigat-

ion arising under it has been enormous and the number of cases
which have been before the courts for decision can hardly be
computed, and now, after the lapse of two centuries since
its enactment many questions pertaining to it are not definitly spttled.
The parliment of the Mother country enacted this important statute, entitled,

potat

ttueetile

"An Act for the Prevention of Fraudl§

and Perjuries" just one hundred years prior to the Declaration of our National Independence.

It is quite unknown

outside of the British Empire and the United States.
It oripginated in the earnest desire of eminent English jurists, principal among the number, Lord Hale, to prevent the numerous frauds and perjuries which were perpretated
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by means of suborned and perjured witnesses; the most effectual way of doing this was to require a large number of the
most corinon contracts to be reduced to writing and siged by
the party whom it

sought to charge.

The principle obleot of the statute was to. exclude
oral testimony in certain cases where experience had shown
that it was peculiarly liable to abuse.

At the time

when the statute went into gation there was no rule of the
cormon law requiring any executory contract to be manifested
by a writing or any other evidence than that of mere words.
Professor Greenleaf says, (Greenleaf on Evidence),
'

This statute introduced no new princip3b into the law; it

was new in England only. in the mode of proof which it
dd.

requir-

Some protective regulations may be foumd in some of the

early codes of most of the Northerfi nations as well as in the
laws it

the Anglo Saxon

princes.

In the Anglo Saxon law,

such regulations were quite familiar and the statute of
frauds was merely the revival of absolute provisions deman-

ded by the circumstances of the times and adoptes in a new
mode. of proof to the conditions and habits of the trading
community.

The statute left the

common law untouched in

all respects except where it expressely provided a different
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rule. '
It has always been doubted by wise lawyers and
judges whether this statute has not caused and protected as
many frauds as it has prevented.

But the same reasons which

led to its enactment has always produced a prevailing belief
that on the whole it is useful.
The 17th. section of the statute of frauds is in
the following words: 'And be it enacted that from and after
the said four and twentieth day of June A.D. 1677; no contract
for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandizes,
price of IOJ

for the

or upwards shallfallowed to be good except the

buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the
bargain or in part payment, or that some note or memorandum
in writing, of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such contracts or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.'
With only slight amendments this statute has been
enacted in all of our states with perhaps one or two exceptions.

It caine subsequently to the settlement of the earlier

American colonies, therefore it was not adopted as part of the
common law but most of the states have patterned after it
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and have ,in substance enacted the same statute.

MEMORANDUM.

Its Form.
The 'form in which tie memorandum it. ,written is imnmaterial providing it contains all the requisite elements of a
contract.

Any in strument which describes the property

sold, the price to be paid therefor, if the price has been
agreed upon, the parties and the essential terms of the
agreement,either by its own terms or by reference to other
writings, if the reference is so clear that it will not be
necessary to have recourse to parol evidence to explain or
establish itis

as valid and binding as the most formal in-

strument which could be constructed.
It is not necessary
that the memorandum should be contemporaneous with the contract but it

is sufficient if

it

has been made at any time

afterwards and then,anything under the hand of the party
.sought~'to be charged admitting that he had entered into the
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agrement will be sufficient to satisfy the statute, which
was only intended to protect parties from having parol agreements imposed upon them.

The statute does not require the

contract itself shall be in writing but that it shall be
evidenced by a writing under the hand of the party to be
charged.
The courttsaid in Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.
325,' The purpose of this celebrated enactment as declared
in the-preamble and gathered from all its provisions, is to
prevent fraud5,and falsehood by requiring a party who seeks to
enforce an oral contract in courtto produce as additional
evidence some written memorandum signed by the party sought
to be charged, or proof of somd act confirmatory of the contract relied on.

It does nt prohibit such contract.

It

does.not declare that it shall be void or illegal unless
certain formalities are observed.

If executed the effect of

its performance on the rights of the parties is not changed
and the consideration may be recovered.'
In Bailey v. Ogden 3 John. 399 an entrywas made by
the vendor of sugars inhis

book of sales,of the name of the

purchaser and the terms of the cmtract of sale,which was
read~to the ag.ent of the vendee who made the purchase and as-

6

sented to by him as correct.

This was held not to be a suf-

ficient memorandum in writing, it not being signed by the
party to be charged.
Kent, Chancellor said,'The form of the memorandum of
the bargain is not material but it must state the contract
with reasonable certain ty, so that,the substance of it can
be understood from the writing itself without having recourse
to parol pro0f.'

Consideration.
In Wain v. Walters 5 East I0. which was a promise
to pay the debt of a thi*d personibut where the consideration
for the pronise was not stated in writing ,ib was held that
parol proof of the consideration was inadmissible under the
statute and the promise was therefore void. The American
authorities are out of harmony as to the necessity (.,of expressing the consideration.

The statutes of some states

require that the consideration be expressed in the note or

memorandum of sale whi]e in others it
it need not be expressed.

specially provides that

The courts of New York previous

to .the ameniment of the statute in 1863 which struck out the
clause requiring the consideration to be expressed, ruled
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that the memorandum must+ contain the whole a-rrement and all
its material terms and conditions and followed the case of

Wain v. WAlters

.

But the chanpe of 1863 has given rise to

a new question and bred in the courts a wide difference of
opinion.
In Speyers v. Lambert 6 Abb. N.S. the General Term
held, that the amendment had the effect to make it wholly
unecessary for any statement of the consideration.
The contrary was held in

Castile v. Beardsely 10 Hun

343.

Thus the law in New York state awaits the action of the
Court of Appeals for a final determination of this point.
Judge Finch argues in Drake v. Seaman 97 N.Y.

'

that the amendment of 1863 had the *ff~ct of restoring the
law as it was before the words were inserted and that the consideration must appear in the agreement.

If we were to

judge from the dictum in this case.,we could easily conclude
what would be the final decision of the court upon the this
point,but a better and more logical conclusion would seem to

be, that the legislature whenit enacted this statute intended
to embody the whole common law on the subject of considerat-.
ion, as it existed, in the statute and the result of the amendment of 1863 was to repeal the

lause requiring the consid-

8

eration to be expressed,which rbeat had the effect to abrogate the law as it previously existed under the statute and
not to restore

it.,as it existed in

Wain v. Walters.

It may be stated as a general rule that unless the
statute expressely requires ft no consideration need be ex.
pressed in the memorandum of salJ.

Price.
If any price is actually agreed uponwhen the verbal
contract is entered into mid it is of the essence of the con,
tractit must be embodied in the memorandum but if the verbal
contract is silent as to the price then it is not necessary,
that Lt should be stated in the memorandum.

A contract pro-

viding that the price shall be fixed by appraisers or any
other method will be sufficient.
In Hoadley v. M'Laie the defendant gave plaintiff
an order for a handsome laudulet.

Nothing was said about

the price.
Tindal Ch. J. said,'This is a contract which is
silent as to price and the parties therefore leave it to the
law to ascertain what~ the commodity cont±'acted foris reasonably worth'

Parke J. said,'It is only necessary that price

should be mentioned when price is one of the ingred±ents of
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the bargain and it is admitted on all hands that if a specific price be agreed on, and that price is omitted in the memorandum, it is insufficient.'

Parties to the Agreeme t..
In order that there may be a binding contract it is
recessary~that both buyer and seller should be noned or sufficiently described in the instrument.

If the writing shows

by'description with whom the bargain was made then the statute is'satisfied and(Iparol evidence is admissible

to supply

Iff one party is not designated at all

the description.

plainly the whole contract is not in writing for it'1akes two
to make a bargain

.'

In Champion v. Plummer 3 B.&P. 252 the plaintiff by
his agent wrote down in a memorandum bookIthe terms of the
sale to him by the defendant, and the defendant signed

he

writing but the words were sirply Bought of W, Plumnmer &c'
with no name of the person who bought.
Sir Mansfield C.J.
said, ' Fowthat be said to be a contr'act_

or memorandum of a

contract which does not state who are the contracting parties?

By this note it

gods were sold.

does not at all apear to whom t he

It would proove a sale to any other pers-

IO
on

r3as

well as to the plaintiff.'

Subj ect Matter.
The sukject matter of the contract,or in other words.
the namp of the article of salemust be sufficiently stated
in the memorandum

that the prdperty may be identified with-

out thr aid from parol evidence.

A reference may be made

to other papers, which if taken together, render the d eseription clear nd definite will suffice.

It is not necessary

that the agreement should contain a very accura+.e descriptio"n
of the property to be sold, as parol evidence is admissible
to identify it where the note or memorandu m contains sufficient data to apply the description to the subject matter.
If it does not contain either in itself or by reference to
some other writing the means of identifying the property,
it is insufficient.
In Clark v. Chamberlain 102 Mass. lo4, the memorand
un of sale sirply described the land as lots nunber one and
to
MortonJsai,' The isuperabe deficiency in the
plaintiff's case is that the memorandum in writin g does not
contain a description of the p remisos sold to
satisfy the statute o f frauds.

sufficiently

It does not in itself or

II
by reference to other writings contain the means of identifyItshows that the defendantogreed to purch-

inathe premisres.

ase a part of a large tract of lani owned by the plaintiff
but furn ishes no means of determining what or how large a
part.

Credit.
All,. the terms and conditions of the contract must
,Wear in the memorandum.

If there is a reference to other

papers which containg the terms of the contract and the reference is so clear that the whole contract, can be ascertainedwithout the aid of extrinsic evidence in explanation the
memorandum is sufficient.
In O'Donnell V. Leeman 43 Maine 158,

the defendant

sold a dwelling house to the plaintiff at auction, upon
certain specified terms snd conditions.

According to the

one third
alleged contract the price to be paid was01200.
cash down, and the residue in equal payments in and one and
two years.

The memorandum of sale failed to state the

t~rms of payment.

It was attempted at the trail to show

the terms of ,paymnent by the introduction of cer t ain handbills
ad newspaper notic es, which were exhibited at the time of
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It was held that where no terms of payment are

the sale.

stated in a contract the money must be paid in a reasonable
time.

Collateral Papers.
The memorandum may consist of several papers as
well as one and if they contain the complete ",bargain they
form together such a memorandum as will satisfy the statute.
In such a case the papersAhave a clear reference
ahother

,

to one

in order that the court may construe all of them

together without the aid of extrinsic evidence.
In Western UNion Tel. Co. V. Chicago & c R.R.CO.
86 Ill. 246, a written contract existed between the parties
for the building and operating of a telegraph line, the memorandum was signed by the telegraph company and a copy of it
sent to the rrail road company, which accepted it by a letter
Held that the
of it s agent but did not sign the contract.
letter of acceptance in which the contract was clearly referr
ed to showed the assent, and

hat the contract wa

complete

withbin the statute.
In Talman V. Franklin 14 N.Y.

584. it was held that

a document was made a part of a memorandum by being' fastenedt
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to it by a pin.
But if it be necessary to adduce parol evidence in
order to connect a siped paper with others then the several

papers do not constitute a memorandum in writing of the bargain so as to satisfy the statute.

If the reference is

smbigous parol evidence will be admitted to explain the oibigtity.
In Lonp V. Miller 4 C.P. 450. Thesiger, J.' said,
'When it i

proposed to proove theexistence of a contract by

several documents it must appear upon the face of theinstrumont aigned by the party to be charged, that reference is
made to another document and thi omission cannot be supplied
by verbal evidence.

If however0 it appears from the instru-m

ment that another document is referred to that document may
be identified by verbal evidence.

A simple illustration of

this rule is given in Ridgeway V. Horton; there instructions
were referred to; now instructions may be either written or
verbal; but it was held that parol evidence might be adduced
to show that certain instr'uctions in writting were intended.

This rule of interpretation is merely a particular application
as to

atent~ambiuity.'

• The authorities are harmonious

in maintaining these
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principles.

Letters to a Third Person.
The note or memorandum required by the statute
need not pass between the parties
third person.

If it

hit may be addressed to a

can be distinctly ascertained from the

written communications without the aid of oral evidence what
are the terms of the contract, the memorandum

will be-suffic-

ient to satisfy the statute.
In Gibson V. Holland I C.P. I, plaintiff was a horse
ck.aler.

The defendant authorized one Rooke to purchase a

mare of the plaintiff.

00

After the mare had been purchased

the defendant refused to pay for her, his defence being insuf
ficient memorandum.

One of the papers relied on as constiti

uting the memorandum was a letter written by the plaintif f to
Rooke referring to letters which the agen t had written, on
which the lat+,er had made the contract.

Held the letters

taken together form a sufficientmemorandum.

Letter Repudiating Conthract.
A letter written for the purpose of repudiating, a
contract may consttitute a memorandum of it

if

there is an
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admission of the contract and its sub'stantial terms are
stated.

The letter relied on must in itself contain +he

terms of the contract, quantity, quality, price of the godds
etc. or it mist refer to some other paper containing them
in such a way as by its own terms to connect itself with
said paper.
In Bailey V. Sweeting 30 C.P. 150, the letter was
as follows:"In reply to your letter of the Ist. instant I
beg to say that the only parcel of goods selected for ready
money was the chimney-glases amountinp: to 38

lOs, 6d, which

goods I have never received and have long since declined to
have for reasons made known at thn time &c.'

Earl J.. in

his opinion said,'The letter in eff'ect says this to the
plaintiff:'

I made a bargain with you for the purchase of

chimney glasses but I decline to have them because the carrier broke thei/'

Now the first part of the letter is unques-

tionable a note or memorandum of the bargain.

It contains

the price and all the substance of the contract and there cou
could be no dispute if it had stopped there, it

would have be

been a g~ood memgranflum of the contract wi~hin the meaning
of the statute.'

In'Cave

V.

Hastings 7 Q.B. Div 125, an action for tbe
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breach of a contract for the hire of a carriage for more than
one year from the date of the agreement, it was prooved that
the plaintiff agreed to let the carriage to the Oiendant.
A memorandum of the terms of the agreement, was signed by the
plaintiff but not by the defendant.

The defendant subse-

quently wrote a letter to the plaintiff desiring to terminate
the agreement, in whi ch he referred to,"our arrangement for
the hire of your carriagle" and,"my monthly payment'.

There

was no other arrangement between the parties, to which the
Pxpressions of the defendant could have reference wieclt
the agreement contained in the memor'an'um signed by the plaintiff.

Held, that the letter of the defendant was so connec-

*tpd by reference to the document containing the terms of the
contract as to constitute

memorandum within the statute of

frauds.
These decisions have been cited approvingly in num erous cpses of recent date both in England and America and
this i1 unquestionably the

ttled Iaw.

'he iaw hereIasin

numerous other cases seems very inconsistent.

Takingj

the

above case for an example, if the defendan~t had gene to the
plaint.iff and verbally manifes+ted his intention of" terminating the co ntract he could not have been held because there
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would not then have been any signature under his hand, but

having written a leter and made reforence to, our arrangempnt' he is held on his contract there being thena sufficient note of menor andum to satily the statute.

Reference.
In order that collateral papers may hP embodied in
a memorandum so as to make them a part of the contract, the
note or memorandum must clearly peint out the writing

eferr-

ed to, so that parol evidence need not be adduced to connect
the writings.

The papers should on their face suf ficiently

demonstrate a reference.

Sale by Auction.
An auctioneer is the agent of the vpndor alone until
the bid is krnoc ked off, when he becomes also the Rgent of
the vendee for th' purpose of perfecting the sale, and it is
upon the glound of this dual capacity that the memorandum of
a sale made by him at the time thereof and before the agency
ceases is

hinding upon both.

Amemorandum made by an auct-

ioneer in order to be vafl, must' have been made contemporaneously with the sale, must cutain the names of thn vendor and
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vendee,

a description of the property sold, and the term§ of

the sale, so that, resort to exq-rinsic evidenue will not be
necessary, and if aid is required from the posters or advertisements of the sale they must be referred to in the memorandun or they cannot be regarded as a part thereof or used
in evidence.

No formality is required.

It is not ex-

pected that the terms of the sale will be set Porth with
technical precision.
In Baptist Church V. Bigelow 16 Wend. 28 where a
pew in a church was sold at public auction and the only memorandum of the sale was an entry made by the auctioneer on
a chart or plan of the ;round floor of the church, exhibited
at the sale of the name of the purchaser and the sum bid by
him.

Held,the memorandum was not sufficient within thre

requirments of the New York

atute although at the time of

the auction, a written or printed advertisement con.aining the
conditions of sale was exhibited and read to the purchpser.
In Talman V. Frankliri
ed a letter signed by the owner,

Supra, the auctioneer att achwhich- stated the terms oftth

the sale on a page of his bok; then made the residue of the
entries requisite to "constitute a memorandu' of the contract
and subscribe his n~'ne to it.

IHeld, that the letter was to

19
be taken as a part of the memorandum subscribed by the auctioneer and rendered it sufficient within the statute.

Records of Corporations.
The records of a corporation may contain the terms
of a contract sufficient to constitute a memorandum within
The actions and resolutions of a corporate

the statute.

body are ordinarily expressdin the minutes recorded by its
secretary or its clerk and subscribed by him in his official
capacity.

. Therefore,when there is sufficient evidence of

the terms of a contract and the mi minutes are signed properly, there is a satisfactory compliance to the sta'ute.

For

there is soie note or memorandum subscribed by the party to
be charged thereby.
In Argus Co. V. Albany 55 N.Y. 495 the common council
of the city of Albany adoptd a

resolution that the proceed-

ings of the board should be published in. one daily paper to
be designated by the board.

The Argus was designated.

Afterwards the comon council awarded the printing to three
other papers.

The plaintiff protested.

It was held that

the resolution under which ' the plaintiff was appointed city
printer~ created a valid contact in writing under the statute
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of frauds and entitled the plaintiff to recover the compensation apTeed upon for the whole period.

Signature.
The note or memorandum must be signed by the parties
to be charged or their,'agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
The question of signature is one of intention, a
question of fact to be detrmined from the other circumstances
of the case.

It may be in writing in pencil

it miay be printed.

or ink, or

It may be in the body of the writing

or~at the beginning or end of it.

When the signature is

out of its usual position, other than at the foot of the
instrument,

it -hen becomes a question of intention-whether

the signature is a valid oneor not.
In

Bennett V. Brumf it 3 C.P. 31 where a party af-

fixed his name to a memorinium on which was engraved a facsimile of hi s ordinary signature.

Held that the writing was

signed within the statute of frauds.
All that is requirdd is that the iITpression be put
upon the paper by th

case whether by pencil

hand oft the party signing.
,

In each

stamp or even initials, it is a pers-.

onal iact~of~the party and to all intents

and purposes a
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signing of the document by him.

Signature by one of the Parties.
The Seventennth section of the statute requires the
memorandum to be signed"by the parties to be charged'.

It

will be important here to consider the object of the statute.
It is entitled "An act for the Prevention of Frauds and PerIs not the end and object of the statute attain-

juries.

ed.by written proof of the obligation of the party to be
charged ?

He is the party to be charged with a liability

and he is to be protected against the dangers of fat seeand
oral testimony.
The term parties' in this section is used in connection with the words'to be charged thereby" and ("oes not
necessarily include nor can it te construed to include all
It is on the contrary restric-

the parties to the contract.

ted to such only of those parties as are to be legally'te-b#
bound and responsible on the contract.
In Mason V. Decker 72 N.Y. 595, the defendant signed
and delivered to the plaintiff an agreement to bu~y certain
corporate stock upon terms specified and the latter agreed

by parol to sell.

Earl J

.,

said," It is claimed on the
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part of the deferdant that the plaintiff cannot recover on
the last agreement because it was not mutual and that there
was no consideration expressed in the paper to make the agreement on the part of the defendant binding upon him, for
the reason that there was no agreement to sell.
was an ample consideration for the last agreement.

But there
The

agreement of the seller to sell need not be in the paper
signed by the purchaser.

If the purchaser signs an agree-

ment to buy and delivers it to the seller and he agrees by
parol to sell upon. the terms mentioned in the paper signed
by the purchaser there is a

binding contract which can be

enforced against the purchaser.

Parol Evidence
It is quite beyond the scope of the present treatise
to discuss to any great extent the law o+v evidence but a
brief examination will perhaps make the subject more complete.
The question of the admission and rejection of oral evidence
to vary and existing written contract has caused an endless
amount of litigation and yet the question is far from being
settled.

The exi stence of a memoranc!um presupposes an ante-
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cedent parol contract, therefore in would be contrary to all
reason to allow oral evidence to be adduced to vary the terms
and defeat the very object which the memorandum was intended
to guard against;

Not only is it contrary to the s tatute of

frauds but to the common law before the statute, to add aiything to an agreement in writing, by parol.
But there are certain cases in which it would be
unjust not to allow parol evidence to be introduced.
generally

it is

admissible to show that the writing which purports

to be a memor andum of the contract is not a record of any
antecedent parol contract at all; phrol evidence is admissible
to show a mistake in reducing the oral contract to writing;
and as general rule to show a latent ambiguity.
The question of the admission and rejection of parol evidence is discussed at great length in all the works on
evidence and treatises on the statute of frauds.

IT -.af-

As the
fords a field of constant litigation and dispute.
subject could not be treated with any degree of thoroughness
at this place it has only been alluded to in a brief manner.,

